Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr <p>The<em> Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review</em> brings articles, legal developments and case reports to academics, practitioners and the industry in relation to digital evidence and electronic signatures from across the world. The review also seeks to include reports on technical advances and book reviews, and is issued once a year, in October/November, although we publish articles throughout the year once they are accepted for publication.</p> <p>This freely available Open Access version of<em> Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review</em> has been developed by Stephen Mason with the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS), School of Advanced Study, University of London on the SAS Open Journals System.</p> Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London en-US Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 1756-4611 Editorial https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5472 Stephen Mason ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 i ii 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5472 Revising the Saudi Electronic Transactions Law on E-Signatures https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5391 <p>Acknowledging the ever-increasing significance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the global e-commerce market, this article critically examines the e-signature regime of the 2007 Saudi Electronic Transactions Law and its implementing regulation. In doing so, it considers the evolution of the European regime on e-signatures, from Directive 1999/93/EC to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (the eIDAS Regulation). The article primarily concludes that the Saudi legislature’s approach to e-signatures has been overly restrictive and calls for different, permissive and careful consideration.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p><strong>Index words:&nbsp;</strong>Electronic signature, e-commerce, e-transactions, Saudi Arabia, European Union, eIDAS Regulation, comparative analysis.</p> Oways Kinsara ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 1 11 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5391 Scandal at the Post Office https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5395 <p>The Post Office Horizon scandal in the United Kingdom, possibly the most extensive miscarriage of justice in English legal history, was caused by a number of interrelated factors. These include: the legal <em>presumption</em> that computers are reliable; the unwillingness and failure of judges to order appropriate and necessary disclosure of documents by the Post Office, where required to ensure fairness at trial; the unethical conduct by the board and management of the Post Office; failure by government – the Post Office’s owner, and questionable litigation strategies adopted by the Post Office’s lawyers.</p> <p><strong>Index words</strong>: Post Office; Horizon IT system; disclosure; discovery; electronic evidence; ethics; politics</p> Paul Marshall ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-01-11 2022-01-11 12 28 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5395 Electronic Execution of Documents Interim Report https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5423 <p>An Industry Working Group set up by a public appointments competition has recently produced <em>Electronic Execution of Documents Interim Report</em> via the Ministry of Justice. The Law Commission dealt with this issue in 2019 in <em>Electronic execution of documents</em> (Law Com No 386, HC2624) and it was suggested that uncertainties may have influenced the degree of confidence of users. The aim of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the Interim Report and its uncritical acceptance of the suggestion.</p> <p><strong>Index words</strong>: Ministry of Justice; England &amp; Wales; electronic execution; electronic documents; electronic signatures; recommendations</p> Mark King ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-02-28 2022-02-28 29 41 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5423 The Post Office IT scandal – why IT audit is essential for effective corporate governance https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5425 <p>The Post Office Horizon scandal is possibly the most serious corporate failure in the United Kingdom in living memory, and possibly for more than a century. This is because of its disastrous consequences for hundreds (perhaps thousands) of individuals who were wrongly prosecuted by the Post Office and who lost their livelihoods, and often their homes, on the basis of incomplete and misleading evidence from its Horizon computerized accounting system. That corporate failure has given rise to the most extensive miscarriage of justice in English legal history, with an unprecedented number of wrongful convictions now in the process of being reversed.The Post Office Horizon scandal had many features and causes, but a significant contributory failure was that of corporate governance. There were many warning signs over the years, which should have been acted upon by Post Office Internal Audit and in particular, by specialist IT auditors. The evidence is clear that the Post Office failed to live up to its commitment to corporate governance, and that this failure was neither detected nor acted upon by the government, if civil servants and ministers were aware of the failure, until too late. An effective IT audit function would have contributed significantly to a prevention of the scandal.</p> <p><strong>Index words</strong>:<strong>&nbsp;</strong>Post Office, Horizon, Fujitsu, IT audit, internal audit, corporate governance, Three Lines of Defence, Institute of Internal Auditors, IIA, AICPA, IAASB, SSAE 16, SSAE 18, ISAE 3402, SAS 70, ISAE 3000, SOC-1, SOC-2, SOC-3, Trust Services Criteria, processing integrity, Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance, Ernst &amp; Young</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> James Christie ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-03-26 2022-03-26 42 86 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5425 Assigning IACS cybersecurity responsibility conformant with the UK Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5427 <p><span class="TextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0" lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US" data-contrast="none"><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">Industrial plants </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">constituting</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> a society’s critical infrastructure, for example electricity-generation and water-supply, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">contain</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> industrial automation and control systems (IACS). IACS nowadays increasingly </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">contain</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> many digital-electronic components whose </span><span class="NormalTextRun SpellingErrorV2Themed SCXW91804407 BCX0">behaviour</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> is software-controlled. Amongst engineered artifacts, software and thus software-controlled systems are particularly susceptible to functional weakness (‘bugs’ and ‘vulnerabilities’). Such weakness can be exploited by nefarious parties (‘hackers’) to disrupt the critical operation of the plant; a phenomenon called cyber-insecurity </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW91804407 BCX0">whose</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> contrary, cybersecurity, refers to the resistance of the plant to such </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">exploitation</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">. The UK Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">SI</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> 2018 No. 506 (NIS Regulations) address the cybersecurity of systems within the critical infrastructure, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">establishing</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> response and reporting requirements for cybersecurity incidents. In January 2022, Her Majesty’s Government issued a call for comments on enhancing the NIS Regulations, following a 2020 review. We derive here detailed </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0">organisational</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> reporting and response requirements based on a computer-scientific understanding of the engineering issues, in an environment which includes a central vulnerability-reporting </span><span class="NormalTextRun SpellingErrorV2Themed SCXW91804407 BCX0">organisation</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91804407 BCX0"> (ICS-CERT, now part of US CISA (CISA, no date), or cyber security incident response team (CSIRT)) as required under the NIS Regulations.</span></span><span class="EOP SCXW91804407 BCX0" data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:160,&quot;335559740&quot;:259}">&nbsp;</span></p> <p><span class="EOP SCXW91804407 BCX0" data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:160,&quot;335559740&quot;:259}"><strong><span class="TextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0" lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US" data-contrast="none"><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0">Index words</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0" lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US" data-contrast="none"><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0">:</span></span> <span class="TextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0" lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US" data-contrast="none"><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0">IACS, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0">ICS</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0">, cybersecurity, responsibility, safety, software, vulnerabilities, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0">organisational</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW179404290 BCX0"> responsibility, duties, mandate.</span></span><span class="EOP SCXW179404290 BCX0" data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:160,&quot;335559740&quot;:259}">&nbsp;</span></span></p> Peter Bernard Ladkin Martyn Thomas ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-05-10 2022-05-10 87 101 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5427 Implementing the electronic signature law in Tanzania – successes, challenges, and prospects https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5467 <p><strong><span data-contrast="auto">Abstract</span></strong><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:160,&quot;335559740&quot;:360}">&nbsp;</span></p> <p><span data-contrast="auto">In a bid to implement the Electronic Transactions Act 2015, Tanzania initiated the adoption of a National Public Key infrastructure (PKI) framework. However, the plan has not been executed as expected because of certain gaps and ambiguities in the laws. This article examines the existing laws providing for the legal validity, admissibility and enforceability of electronic signatures especially using PKI; identifies the weaknesses of the existing laws and recommends new laws relevant to PKI that should be considered, and their rationale.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:160,&quot;335559740&quot;:360}">&nbsp;</span></p> <p><strong><span data-contrast="auto">Index word</span></strong><span data-contrast="auto">s:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Tanzania, electronic signature, PKI, cryptography, certification</span></p> Ubena John ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 102 116 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5467 Practitioner Note https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5473 <p><span data-contrast="auto">Árpád</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Geréd and Alexandra Prodan discuss a recent case regarding the use of electronic signatures in procurement between jurisdictions. The failure to understand such details when tendering between jurisdictions almost caused a public tender worth € 3 billion to fail.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;</span></p> <p><strong><span data-contrast="auto">Index words</span></strong><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}"><strong>:</strong>&nbsp;</span><span data-contrast="auto">Austria; Switzerland; signature procurement requirements; qualified electronic signature</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;</span></p> Árpád Geréd Alexandra Prodan ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 117 119 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5473 Electronic signature law update https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5475 <p><span data-contrast="none">Avukat</span><span data-contrast="none"> Özgür </span><span data-contrast="none">Eralp</span><span data-contrast="auto"> provides an up-date to the electronic signature laws of Turkey, setting out the full history of electronic signature legislation and recent legislative developments.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;</span></p> <p><strong><span data-contrast="auto">Index words:&nbsp;</span></strong><span data-contrast="auto">Turkey; electronic signatures; legislation; update</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;</span></p> Avukat Özgür Eralp ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 120 122 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5475 Briefing Note https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5476 <p><strong><span data-contrast="auto">Abstract</span></strong><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;</span></p> <p><span data-contrast="auto">The presumption that computers are reliable in England and Wales is proved to be wrong.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;<span class="TextRun SCXW17683652 BCX0" lang="EN-GB" xml:lang="EN-GB" data-contrast="auto"><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW17683652 BCX0">Nicholas Bohm, James Christie, Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Paul Marshall, Stephen Mason, Martin Newby, Steven J. Murdoch, Harold Thimbleby and Martyn Thomas CBE</span></span></span></p> <p><strong><span data-contrast="auto">Index words:&nbsp;</span></strong><span data-contrast="auto">England and Wales; presumption computers are reliable; proposal to rectify</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559738&quot;:120,&quot;335559739&quot;:120}">&nbsp;</span></p> Nicholas Bohm ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 123 127 Book Reports https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5477 <p>Book Reports</p> Stephen Mason ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 128 131 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5477 General Editors and Editorial Board https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5478 <p>General Editors and Editorial Board</p> Stephen Mason ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 132 133 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5478 PhD Research in process https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5479 <p>PhD Research in process</p> Stephen Mason ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 134 136 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5479 PhD Completed https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5480 <p>PhD Completed</p> Stephen Mason ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 137 149 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5480 Ismay Report https://azsas07c0101.sas-eprints.cdl.cosector.com/deeslr/article/view/5482 <p>Horizon – Response to Challenges Regarding Systems Integrity (Post Office Limited, 2 August 2010)</p> Stephen Mason ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-10-10 2022-10-10 10.14296/deeslr.v19i0.5482